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The Chinese government’s interest in Oceania 
bumped up another notch with the recent publica-
tion of the book’s second edition. Blue Books are 
made available to all government departments, 
stocked in Xinhua Bookstores across China, and are 
seen as the standard reference on any given topic. 
This edition, subtitled China’s 21st Century Maritime 
Silk Road Initiative and the South Pacific Countries 
(Yu 2015), reveals how far Chinese academic and 
government thinking on the Pacific has come in 
recent years. This In Brief describes findings on aid, 
trade and investment, and diplomacy that should be 
of interest to Australian policy-makers.
That this is only the second book to be published 
on Oceania is revealing in itself — regions and coun-
tries that have been considered more important to 
China are on to their fifth edition. The Blue Book 
is edited by Professor Yu Changsen, Director of the 
Center for Oceanian Studies at Sun Yat-Sen University 
in Guangzhou. The rapid development of his Center 
since its establishment in 2012 affirms the growth of 
interest in Pacific Studies in China. 
For a while, the Center was like many others 
across China — a one-man operation lacking seri-
ous funding or support, largely focused on Australia 
and New Zealand. In the past few years, it has grown 
to become the only serious Pacific Studies centre in 
China, with six full-time academic staff, impressive 
undergraduate and postgraduate programs, and the 
capacity to conduct field research in the Pacific. On 
a recent visit, I (Graeme) was pleasantly surprised 
to find myself in a lengthy discussion with students 
on the significance of the Sandline Affair for the 
development of the international military contract-
ing business. In contrast to many Chinese university 
centres, the Center is starting to develop links with 
government beyond the Ministry of Education silo.
The future of Chinese aid is reflected in a 
contribution from Yao Shuai, a researcher at the 
Chinese Academy of International Trade and Eco-
nomic Cooperation (CAITEC), an influential think 
tank affiliated with China’s Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM) — the agency charged with managing 
China’s aid program. In practice, much of MOFCOM’s 
policy development on foreign aid, as well as the 
drafting of five-year country plans, is outsourced to 
CAITEC. Yao’s chapter, Focus on Pan-Peripheral: 
China’s Foreign Aid to Pacific Island Countries, 
hints at the possible — or desired — future of  
China’s aid policies in the Pacific. Yao concludes:
In future, [China Aid] should build basic eco-
nomic infrastructure and establish [transport 
and communication] links between South Pa-
cific nations. It’s also crucial to cater to the 
trait of island countries to build their socie-
ties around scattered tribal groups. By initiat-
ing small, smart projects that address people’s 
livelihoods and build capacity we can raise the 
educational standards of their workforces and 
enhance their ability to take the lead in their 
own development. We should focus on aid 
that fits with pressing needs. We should take 
advantage of China’s comparative advantage 
in areas like renewables, agriculture and fish-
eries, promoting the ‘island-isation’ of China’s 
development experience and modern tech-
nologies. Because of region’s sensitivity, China 
should be more open, working through multi-
lateral and regional mechanisms, strengthen-
ing communication and cooperation with oth-
er donors. (Authors’ translation)
Yao reveals that the eight Pacific nations that rec-
ognise China, and are thus eligible to receive Chinese 
aid, now have five-year aid plans. Such plans had pre-
viously been in place, but MOFCOM did not officially 
acknowledge their existence until November 2014, 
when they issued the Measures for the Administration 
of Foreign Aid (for trial implementation). While still 
in draft form, it is the first comprehensive regulation 
on China’s foreign aid management. This document 
states China will make a medium- to long-term aid 
plan, establish an aid project reserve fund and make 
country-based aid plans. While the country plans are 
unlikely to be made public, it does point to MOFCOM 
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attempting to nuance its assistance to the Pacific, and 
to take back some control from the contracting com-
panies that ‘reverse engineer’ China’s aid program.
The centrality of commerce to China’s engage-
ment with the Pacific is apparent from the table of 
contents, which is dominated by analysis of China’s 
trade and investment. One of the more intriguing 
pieces of analysis addresses a conundrum for Chi-
nese policy-makers: since 2009 China has traded 
more with countries in the Pacific that do not rec-
ognise China that those that do. The strength of 
PNG’s resource exports to China — largely logs, gas 
and nickel — mean that this equation was reversed 
in 2014, but it has long been a source of concern to 
Chinese policy-makers as it challenges the official 
line that countries who recognise Taiwan will miss 
out on an economic windfall.
Pan Qing and Ye Jing, in their chapter Trade 
Imbalances Between China and South Pacific Coun-
tries in the 21st Century, find that, as is often the 
case, the ‘imbalance’ is an artefact of MOFCOM’s 
statistical reporting system. Both trade and invest-
ment statistics measure the first destination (for 
outbound flows) or final source (inbound), mean-
ing that tax havens such as Hong Kong, the British 
Virgin Islands and closer to home, Samoa — which, 
according to official figures, invests more in China 
than Germany does — are over-represented. In the 
case of Pacific trade, the ship-flagging operation run 
out of the Marshall Islands means that the actual 
destination of the vessels that are China’s largest 
export to the Pacific is everywhere but the Pacific — 
Germany, Poland, Thailand and Spain top the list.
In terms of investment, recent deals that many 
observers have overlooked caught the attention of 
Fei Sheng and Huang Guanhua in their review of 
Pacific island issues. They highlight the visit of a 
delegation from the People’s Bank of China to Fiji in 
January 2014, where they met Manasa Vaniqi, Fiji’s 
then first permanent secretary for sugar. The del-
egation proposed purchasing 100,000 tons of sugar 
from Fiji and jointly establishing a sugar refinery. 
Fei and Huang also noted that a Hong Kong-based 
Chinese company set up the Pacific International 
Commercial Bank in Tonga in April 2014, becom-
ing the first Chinese commercial bank in the Pacific. 
It was a bold venture, but despite being formally 
opened by King Tupou VI, is in liquidation talks.
In his chapter, The Pacific Islands in China’s 
Strategy for the 21st Century, Yu Changsen argues 
the islands are strategically important because:
•  Geographically, they are the only sea route 
between China and South America, Antarctica, 
Australia and New Zealand. They are also part 
of the second and third island chains of defence 
established by the US and its allies.
•  Economically, they are the natural extension of 
China’s new Maritime Silk Road initiative, and can 
be a testing ground for South-South cooperation.
•  Politically, they are central to China’s national uni-
fication as six of them maintain diplomatic rela-
tions with Taiwan. 
• Culturally, they can be a testing place for China’s 
public diplomacy and soft power strategy. 
He suggests China increase its diplomatic com-
mitment in the region, which is admittedly limited. 
However, his suggestion that China’s navy work with 
foreign forces to maintain the security of the mari-
time transport routes sounds ambitious at a time 
when China has growing disputes nearby regions 
such as the South China Sea. 
With 22 chapters, including contributions from 
US, New Zealand and Australian scholars, the book 
is a statement that the Chinese government is willing 
to devote intellectual resources to a region that was 
once a peripheral interest, at best. 
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